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1. Introduction
Biometrics have long been used as means to recognize people, mainly in terms of their
physiological characteristics, for various commercial applications ranging from surveillance
and access control against potential impostors to smart interfaces (Qazi (2004)) (Xiao (2005)).
These systems require reliable personal recognition schemes to either confirm or determine
the identity of an individual requesting their services. The biometric methods, that are usually
incorporated in such systems, can be categorized to physiological and behavioral (Jain et al.
(2004)), depending on the type of used features.
The most popular physiological biometric traits are the fingerprint (Maltoni et al. (2009)) that
is widely used in law enforcement for identifying criminals, the face (Chang et al. (2005))
and the iris (Sun & Tan (2009)). However, despite their high recognition performance, static
biometrics have been recently overwhelmed by the new generation of biometrics, which tend
to cast light on more natural ways for recognizing people by analyzing behavioural traits.
Specifically, behavioural biometrics are related to specific actions and the way that each
person executes them. In other words, they aim at recognizing livingness, as it is expressed
by dynamic traits. The most indicative cases of behavioural biometric recognition is gait
(Goffredo et al. (2009b)), facial expressions (Liu & Chen (2003)) or other activity related,
habitual traits (Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)). As a result behavioural
biometrics have become much more attractive to researchers due to their significant
recognition potential and their unobtrusive nature. They can potentially allow the continuous
(on-the-move) authentication or even identification unobtrusively to the subject and become
part of an Ambient Intelligence (AmI) environment.
The inferior performance of behavioural biometrics, when compared to the classic
physiological ones, can be compensated when they are combined in a multimodal biometric
system. In general, multimodal systems are considered to provide an excellent solution to a
series of recognition problems. Unimodal systems are more vulnerable to theft attempts, since
an attacker can easily gain access by stealing or bypassing a single biometric feature. In the
same concept, they have to contend with a variety of problems, such as noisy data, intraclass
variations, restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks, and unacceptable
error rates, i.e., it is estimated that approximately 3% of the population does not have legible
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fingerprints (Fairhurst et al. (2003)). Such biometric systemmay not always meet performance
requirements, may exclude large numbers of people, and may be vulnerable to everyday
changes and lesions of the biometric feature.
In this context, the development of systems that integrate more than one biometrics is an
emerging trend, since it has been seen that true multimodal biometric systems, that capture
a number of unrelated biometrics indicators, have significant advantages over unimodal
ones. Specifically, most of the aforementioned limitations can be addressed by deploying
multimodal biometric systems that integrate the evidence presented by multiple sources of
information. A multimodal biometric system uses multiple applications to capture different
types of biometrics. This allows the integration of two or more types of biometric recognition
systems, in order to meet stringent performance requirements. Moreover, such systems are
much more invulnerable to fraudulent technologies, since multiple biometric characteristics
are more likely to resist against spoof attacks than a single one.
Last but not least, a major issue of biometric systems is the protection of the sensitive biometric
data that are stored in the database, so as to prevent unauthorized and malicious use. Given
the widespread deployment of biometric systems and the wide exposition of personal data,
public awareness has been raised about security and privacy of the latter. Seemingly, the
voting of several laws concerning the ethical and privacy issues of private data provide a
universal solution unless it is accompanied by the appropriate technological tools.
Unfortunately, simple password-based systems, that provide regular cryptographic solutions
(Uludag et al. (2004)) can not be easily applied, since the representation of behavioural
biometric traits is not fixed over time. Thus, the current issue has been confronted with
modern, sophisticated encryption methods that do not require the exact match of the
prompted and the original signatures in order to grant access.
1.1 Related work
With respect to behavioural biometrics, previous work on human identification can be mainly
divided in two main categories. a) sensor-based recognition (Junker et al. (2004)) and
b)vision-based recognition. Recently, research trends have been moving towards the second
category, due to the obtrusiveness imposed by the sensor-based recognition approaches (Kale
et al. (n.d.)). Additionally, recent work and efforts on human recognition have shown that the
human behavior (e.g. extraction of facial dynamics features (Hadid et al. (2007)). However, the
most known example of behavioural biometrics is the human body shape dynamics (Ioannidis
et al. (2007) or joints tracking analysis (Goffredo et al. (2009a)) for gait recognition. In the same
respect, the analysis of dynamic activity-related trajectories (Drosou, Moustakas & Tzovaras
(2010)) provide the potential of continuous authentication for discriminating people, when
considering behavioural signals.
Although there have been already proposed a series of multimodal biometric systems
concerning static physiological biometric traits (Kumar et al. (2010)) (Sim et al. (2007)) there are
only a few dealing solely with behavioural traits (Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras
(2010)). In any case, the main issue in a multimodal biometric system is the optimization
of its fusion mechanism. In a multimodal biometric system, integration can be done at
(i) feature level, (ii) matching score level, or (iii) decision level. However, matching score
level fusion is commonly preferred because matching scores are easily available and contain
sufficient information to distinguish between a genuine and an impostor case. In this respect,
a thorough analysis of such score-level fusion methods regarding biometric traits has been
presented in (Jain et al. (2005)).
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Since all biometric systems deal with the issue of storing biometric data, different approaches
regarding their security have been suggested. In the current work, an extension of the
security template scheme, presented in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)), is proposed, that bases
on Error Correcting Codes (ECC) and the modeling of channel statistics. Channel codes have
been previously used for the development of authentication schemes. Earlier, in (Wadayama
(2005)), a generic authentication scheme based on channel codes was proposed to improve
security and prevent unauthorized access in secure environments. Also, in (Davida et al.
(1998)), a channel coding scheme was presented for secure biometric storage. Error correcting
codes were employed to tackle the perturbations in the representation of biometric signals and
classification was based on the Hamming distance between two biometric representations.
Based on this concept, the fuzzy commitment scheme was introduced to tolerate more
variation in the biometric characteristics and provide stronger security (Juels & Sudan (2006)).
In this scheme, the user selects at the enrolment a secret message c. Then, the template consists
of the difference between the user’s biometric data x and c along c with an encrypted version
of c. At the authentication, the stored difference d is added to the new biometric representation
y and y+ d is decoded to the nearest codeword c′ using error correcting codes.
In this respect, a series of encryptionmethods have been developed to account for the inherent
variability of biometric signals. Apart from (Davida et al. (1998)), a methodology based on the
Slepian-Wolf theorem (Slepian & Wolf (1973)) for secure storage biometric via Low-Density
Parity Check (LDPC) codes was presented in (Martinian et al. (2005)). The multimedia
authentication problem in the presence of noise was investigated, the theoretical limits of
the system were identified, and the tradeoff among fidelity, robustness, and security was
discussed. This approach provides intuition for the proposed method in this paper; the
biometric recognition problem is considered as the analogous of data transmission over a
communication channel, which determines the efficiency of the system. Interestingly, the
problem of coding distributed correlated sources has also attracted much interest in the field
of video coding recently. The same framework was also employed in (Draper et al. (2007))
in order to secure fingerprint biometrics, image authentication (Yao-Chung et al. (2007)) and
biometric authentication as a wire-tap problem (Cohen & Zemor (2004)).
In the seminal work of (Pradhan & Ramchandran (2003)), the distributed source coding using
syndromes scheme was proposed. Based on this work, the field of distributed video coding
(Girod et al. (2005)) has emerged as a new trend in video coding. Finally, an interesting
approach of applying the LDPC methodology in multimodal biometric systems has been
proposed in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)).
Similarly to above, one of the major concerns in applications that grant access based on a
password, a pin or a token, is the protection of the original data to prevent malicious use from
those who try to access them by fraudulent means. Although this problem in such systems
has been investigated in depth and sophisticated encryption methods have been developed
(Stallings (2006)), a significant issue remains the possibility of having the password stolen or
forgotten. Thus, methods which enable a biometric-related key have been proposed (Álvarez
et al. (2009)). Thus, the required pin is always carried by the user, since it is encoded on
himself.
1.2 Contribution
In the current chapter, a novel framework for activity related authentication in secure
environments based on distributed source coding principles and automatically extracted
biometric keys is proposed. The main novelty is the development of an integrated framework
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that utilizes biometric key based encryption, in order to assist the channel decoding
process and to boost the system’s recognition performance. It is shown that the proposed
system increases the security of the stored templates and ensures privacy of personal
data, while indirectly provides “hybrid” fusion between static and dynamic biometric traits
towards improved recognition results. Moreover, unobtrusive, multimodal, on-the-move
biometric authentication is presented and evaluated in a bimodal scenario, which utilizes two
behavioural traits of the user. Namely, the gait and the activity-related motion trajectories
of the head and the hands during specific movements which are seen to provide a powerful
auxiliary biometric trait are inspected in terms of biometric means for user authentication.
2. Proposed methodology
The architecture of the proposed biometric recognition framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
Initially, from the captured gait image sequence, the moving silhouettes are extracted, the
shadows are removed and the gait cycle is estimated using state-of-art (SoA) algorithms
(Ioannidis et al. (2007)), (Cucchiara et al. (2001)). Using a stereoscopic camera, we detect
those frames in the sequence, whereby the user is standing and we discard them from those
where the user is walking. Then the visual hull of the moving silhouette is extracted using
disparity estimation. Once a view normalization is applied by rotating the silhouette, the
3D reconstructed silhouettes are denoised via spatiotemporal filtering, in order to improve
their quality. Finally, two SoA geometric descriptors are extracted based on the sequence Gait
Energy Image (GEI).
Fig. 1. System Architecture.
The gait recognition follows the principle of a model-free, feature-based analysis of the
extracted human silhouettes, whereby geometric methods implement a robust classifier. In
the following, the activity-related recognition is performed on the users’ movements while
they interact with a security panel installed at the end of the corridor. The extracted motion
trajectories that are used as the user’s biometric traits are classified by a Dynamic Time
Warping classifier and its result is finally fused with the corresponding gait results at the
score level towards an overall recognition outcome.
3. Behavioural biometrics
As it has already been mentioned, the development a novel biometric recognition method
or the improvement of current State of Art (SoA) methodologies in this area, are not within
the scope of the current work. In this context, a set of simple but robust activity-related
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recognition modules have been utilized in the context of the proposed security framework in
order to build a behavioural multimodal recognition system, where the proposed enhanced
security template framework (see Section 4) could be tested and evaluated.
In particular, the first biometric modality consists of SoA gait recognition methodology
(Ioannidis et al. (2007)) that bases on features extracted from spatiotemporal gait patterns.
Similarly, the second modality that has been utilized refers to a novel activity-related concept
that has been initially proposed in (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) and
deals with the motion related traits left by the user during the performance of some simple
activities that are performed on a regular basis. Both aforementioned modalities are not only
directly related to the users’ physiology, but they are also highly governed by the users’
habitual response to external stimuli. Thus, they have been seen to provide significant
recognition capacity, both as stand-alones, as well as in multimodal recognition systems
(Drosou, Ioannidis, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)).
For the convenience of the reader, a short functional description of the aforementioned
modalities is included hereafter. Before presenting the security framework, which is the main
contribution of the current work, a short description of the utilized biometric modalities is
included.
3.1 Gait recognition
Let the term “gallery” refer to the set of reference sequences, whereas the term “probe” stands
for the test sequences to be verified or identified, in both presented modalities.
Initially, the walking human binary silhouette is extracted as described in (Ioannidis et al.
(2007)). The feature extraction process of the gait sequences is based on the Radial Integration
Transformation (RIT) and the Circular Integration Transform (CIT) (Ioannidis et al. (2007)),
but instead of applying those transforms on the binary silhouette sequences themselves, the
Gait Energy Images (GEI) are utilized, which have been proven from one hand to achieve
remarkable recognition performance and on the other hand to speed up the gait recognition
(Han et al. (2006)) (Yu et al. (2010)).
Given the extracted binary gait silhouette images I′ and each gait cycles k, the gray level (GEI)
(Figure 2) is defined over a gait cycle as:
GEIk =
1
CL
·
CycleEnd
∑
k=CycleStart
I′(k) (1)
where CL is the length of the gait cycle and k refer to the gait cycles extracted in the current
gait image sequence.
Fig. 2. Gait Energy Images from several users.
The RIT and CIT transforms are applied on the GEI, in order to construct the gait template
for each user, as shown in Figure 3 in according to the following equations:
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RITf (θ) =
∫
f (x0 + u cos θ, y0 + u sin θ)du (2)
where u is the distance from the starting point (x0, y0).
RIT(t∆θ) =
1
J
J
∑
j=1
GEI(r0 + j∆u · cos(t∆θ), y0 + j∆u · sin(t∆θ))
for t = 1, ..., T with T = 360o/∆θ
(3)
for t = 1, ..., T with T = 360o/∆θ, where ∆θ and ∆u are the constant step sizes of the distance
u and angle θ and J is the number of the pixels that coincide with the line that has orientation
R and are positioned between the center of gravity of the silhouette and the end of the image
in that direction.
Fig. 3. Applying the RIT (left) and CIT (right) transforms on a Gait Energy Image using the
Center of Gravity as its origin.
Similarly, CIT is defined as the integral of a function f (x, y) along a circle curve h(ρ) with
center (x0, y0) and radius ρ. The CIT is computed using the following equation:
CITf (ρ) =
∮
h(ρ)
f (x0 + ρ cos θ + ρ sin θ)du (4)
where du is the arc length over the path of integration and θ is the corresponding angle.
The center of the silhouette is again used as the origin for the CIT. The discrete form of the CIT
transform is used, as depicted graphically in Figure 3/right.
CIT(k∆ρ) =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
GEI(x0 + k∆ρ · cos(t∆θ), y0 + k∆ρ · sin(t∆θ)) (5)
for k = 1, ...,K with T = 360o/∆θ, where ∆ρ, and ∆θ are the constant step sizes of the
radius and angle variables and finally K∆ρ is the radius of the smallest circle that encloses
the grayscaled GEI (Figure 2).
The extracted RIT and CIT feature vectors are then concatenated, in order to form a single 1D
biometric trait.
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3.1.1 Matching
The comparison between the number of gallery GGEI and probe PGEI gait cycles for a specific
feature E ∈ {RIT,KRM} is performed through the dissimilarity score dE.
dE = min
i,j
(
||sGi − s
P
i ||
)
∀i, j; i ∈ [1,GGEI) and j ∈ [1, PGEI) (6)
whereby || · || is the L2-norm between the sG and sP values of the corresponding extracted
feature (i.e. RIT & CIT) for the gallery and the probe collections, respectively.
3.2 Activity-related recognition
The proposed framework extends the applicability of activity-related biometric traits
(Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)), and investigates their feasibility in user
authentication applications.
In (Kale et al. (2002)) and (Drosou, Moustakas & Tzovaras (2010)), it is claimed that the traits
of a subject’s movements during an activity that involves reaching and interacting with an
environmental object can be very characteristic for recognition of his/her identity. Indeed,
given the major or minor physiological differences between users’ bodies in combination
with their individual inherent behavioural or habitual way of moving and acting it has been
reported that there is increased authentication potential in common everyday activities such
as answering a phone call, etc.
In the following, an improved activity-related recognition framework is proposed, that
employs a novel method for the normalization of the trajectories of the user’s tracked points
of interest. The proposed algorithm also introduces a warping method that compensates
for small displacements of the environmental objects and has no effect on the behavioural
information of the movement at all.
As of today, activity related biometrics, where the activity is associated with reaching and
interacting with objects, have always assumed a fixed environment (Drosou, Moustakas &
Tzovaras (2010)), which is not always the case in real life scenarios. However, significant
performance degradations can be observed due to the small variances in the interaction
setting, which are introduced by the arbitrary position of the environmental objects in respect
to the user at each trial. Thus, a post-processing algorithm towards the improvement of the
overall authentication performance that can be employed into biometric systems which utilize
the reaching and interacting concept, is presented in the following.
3.2.1 Motion trajectory extraction
The core of the proposed authentication system used on dynamic motion tracking (4f) is
extensively described in (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) and is briefly
described in the following so as to make the paper self-contained. The userŠs movements
are recorded by a stereo camera and the raw captured images are processed, in order to track
the users head and hands via the successive application of filtering masks on the captured
image.
Specifically, a skin-colour mask (Gomez &Morales (2002)) (4a) combined with a motion-mask
(Bobick & Davis (2001)) (Figure 4d) can provide the location of the palms, while the head
can be accurately tracked via a combination of a head detection algorithm (Viola & Jones
(2004)) enhanced by a mean-shift object tracking algorithm (Ramesh & Meer (2000)) (4b).
Given the pre-calibrated set of CCD sensors mounted on the stereo camera, the real 3D
information can be easily calculated first by performing disparity estimation (4c) from the
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Fig. 4. Tracking methodology: a) Skin filtering - b) Head Tracking - c) Disparity image - d)
Motion Detection - e) Possible hands’ locations - f) Motion trajectories.
input stereoscopic image sequence and then by mapping the 2.5D information onto the 3D
space. After post-processing (Drosou, Moustakas, Ioannidis & Tzovaras (2010)) that is applied
on the raw tracked points, based on moving average window and Kalman filtering, equally
sized and smooth 3D motion trajectories are extracted (Figure 5), which are then used as
activity related biometric traits for proposed modality.
A motion trajectory for a certain limb l (head or palms) is considered as a 3D N-tuple vector
sl(t) = (xl(t), yl(t), zl(t)) that corresponds to the x,y,z-axes location of limbs center of gravity
at each time instance t of an N − f rame sequence. The x,y and z data of the trajectories sl,
are concatenated into a single vector and all vectors, produced by the limbs that take part in a
specific activity c form the trajectory matrix Sc. Each repetition of the same activity by a user
creates a new matrix. Both gallery and probe user-specific set of matrices are subsequently
used as input to the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm 3.2.2 that has been utilized as
classifier for the current biometric modality, in order to provide an authentication score with
respect to the claimed ID (gallery).
3.2.2 Matching via DTW
DTW is used for calculating a metric about the dissimilarity between two (feature) vectors.
It is based on the difference cost that is associated with the matching path computed via
dynamic programming, namely the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm. The DTW
algorithm can provide either a valuable tool for stretching, compressing or aligning time
shifted signals (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)) or a metric for the similarity between two vectors
(Miguel-Hurtado et al. (2008)). Specifically, it has been widely used in a series of matching
problems, varying from speech processing (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)) to biometric recognition
applications (Boulgouris et al. (2004)). The matching between the two vectors is done and a
path is found using a rectangular grid (Figure 6).
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Fig. 5. 3D Motion Trajectories extracted during a “Phone Conversation” activity.
A short description of the functionality of DTW algorithm for comparing two
one-dimensional vectors (probe & gallery signal) is presented below:
The probe vector p of length L is aligned along the X-axis while the gallery vector g of length
L′ is aligned along the Y-axis of a rectangular grid respectively. In our case L ≡ L′ as a result
of the preprocessing steps (Section 3.2.1). Each node (i,j) on the grid represents a match of the
ith element of p with the jth element of g. The matching values of each p(i),g(j) pair are stored
in a cost matrix CM associated with the grid. c(1, 1) = 0 by definition and all warping paths
are a concatenation of nodes starting from node (1, 1) to node (L, L).
The main task is to find the path for which the least cost is associated. Thus the difference cost
between the two feature vectors is provided. In this respect, let (y1(k), y2(k)) represent a node
on a warping path at the instance t of matching. The full cost D(y1, y2) associated to a path
starting from node (1, 1) and ending at node (y1(K), y2(K)) can be calculated as:
D(y1, y2) = D(y1(k− 1), y2(k− 1)) + c(y1, y2) =
k
∑
m=1
c(y1(m), y2(m)) (7)
Accordingly, the problem of finding the optimal path can be reduced to finding this sequence
of nodes (y1(k), y2(k)), which minimizes D(y1(k), y2(k)) along the complete path.
Fig. 6. Dynamic Time Warping Grid.
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As stated by Sakoe and Chiba in (Sakoe & Chiba (1990)), a good path is unlikely to wander
very far from the diagonal. Thus, the path with minimum difference cost, would be the one
that draws the thinnest surface around the diagonal as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 6.
In the ideal case of perfect matching between two identical vectors, the area of the drawn
surface would be eliminated. The size of the closed area SA around the diagonal can be
calculated by counting the nodes V(pi, qj) between the path and the diagonal at every row
(Jayadevan et al. (2009)) as indicated by the following equation.
V(pi, qj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪
1 , if (i > j) of N(pi, qj)
for j = j, j+ 1, ..., j+ d, where d = i− j
1 , if (i < j) of N(pi, qj)
for i = i, i+ 1, ..., i+ d, , where d = i− j
1 , if (i = j) of N(pi, qj)
0 , otherwise
(8)
Thus, the value V(pi, qj) = 1 to these nodes. On the contrary, all other nodes lying outside
the closed area will be assigned the value V(pi, qj) = 0. Then, the total area SA created by the
path is mathematically stated as following:
SA =
L
∑
i=1
L
∑
j=1
V(pi, qj) (9)
whereby
Finally the total dissimilarity measure DM between vector p and g (Equation 9) can be
computed as the product of area size Sc and the minimum full cost D(L, L) (Equation 7):
DM = SA · Dmin(L, L) (10)
4. Biometric template security architecture
As far as the security of the biometric data is regarded, multiple feature descriptors from the
gait modality and the activity-related modality are initially encoded via a Low Density Parity
Check (LDPC) encoder. In the following, the parity bits of the activity-related modality are
encrypted via a biometric-dependent key, so that double secured, non-sensitive biometric data
is stored in the database or in smart cards, which are useless to any potential attackers of the
system.
The proposed method, which resembles a channel coding problem with noisy side
information at the decoder, is shown to improve the authentication rates as they are provided
from the modality-specific classifiers. Additionally to the already known key-encryption
methodologies, the encryption of the parity bits of the secondmodality takes place before their
storage to the database. The novelty lies in the fact the personal encryption/decryption key
used, is inherent in the biometric trait of the first modality and thus, it remains unknown even
to each user. Specifically, in the implemented scenario the biometric key is selected according
to the height and the stride length of the user.
The architecture (Figure 7) of the proposed security is thoroughly described in the next two
Sections, whereby a functional analysis of the utilized distinct components is provided.
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Fig. 7. Security subsystem Architecture.
4.1 Encoding scheme
The first step towards biometric template protection in the current multimodal biometric
cryptosystem is based on distributed source coding principles and formulates biometric
authentication as a channel coding problem with noisy side information at the decoder, as
presented in (Argyropoulos et al. (2009)). The main idea lies on the fact that perturbations
in the representation of the biometric features at different times can be modelled as a
noisy channel, which corrupts the original signal. Thus, the enrolment and authentication
procedures of a biometric system are considered as the encoding and decoding stages of
a communication system, respectively. The proposed formulation enables the exploitation
of the Slepian-Wolf theorem to identify the theoretical limits of the system and minimize
the size of the templates. Moreover, casting the problem of biometric authentication as a
communication problem allows the use of well known techniques in communication systems
such as the exploitation of correlation (or noise) channel statistics by integrating them in the
soft decoding process of the channel decoder.
The architecture of the multimodal biometric authentication system is included in Figure 7.
At the enrolment stage, the feature vectors Fgait and Factivity from the Gait and the Activity -
relatedmodality are initially extracted as described in the previous section. Then, the extracted
feature vectors are quantized and encoded using an (n, k) LDPC channel encoder. It must be
stressed that the rate of the LDPC encoders in Figure 7 is different for each modality and is
calculated according to the Slepian-Wolf theorem
RX ≥ H(X|Y) RY ≥ H(Y|X) RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y) (11)
where RX and RY the achievable rates, H(X|Y) and H(Y|X) are the conditional entropies and
H(X,Y) is the joint entropy of X and Y gallery and probe feature vectors, respectively.
The resulting codewords Sgait and Sactivity comprise the biometric templates of the suggested
modalities and are stored to the database of the system. Thus, if the database of the biometric
system is attacked, the attacker can not access the original raw biometric data or their
corresponding features but only Sgait and Sactivity, which are not capable of revealing sensitive
information about the users.
Similarly the gait and activity-related feature vectors F′gait and F
′
activity are extracted and
quantized at the authentication stage. Subsequently, the syndromes Sgait and Sactivity which
correspond to the claimed ID are retrieved from the database and are fed to the LDPC
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decoders. A similar multimodal approach is thoroughly described in (Argyropoulos et al.
(2009)). Thereby, two biometric traits, i.e. face characteristics and face, have been combined
via concatenation of their feature vectors. Specifically, once the first modality was successfully
decoded, the decoded feature vector was concatenated to probe feature vector of the second
modality. The full feature vector was fed to a second decoder. Thus, enhanced security was
offered, since the second decoder requires that both feature vector resembles the gallery input.
In the proposed approach, the system deals with two behavioural biometric traits separately,
as far as the LDPC algorithm is regarded. However, it must be noted that the two biometric
templates in the proposed scheme are not secured independently from each other.
The basic guidelines of the LDPC encoding/decoding scheme will be presented below in
short, in order to provide a self-consistent paper.
Given the unimodal protection scheme had been used for every biometric modality
independently the rate required to code each feature vector. This in turn would affect the
size of the templates and the performance of the system.
Even if liveness detection is out of the scope of the paper, the multimodal framework provides
tools to guarantee that even if the user is wearing a mask, in order to fake the system, he/she
should also mimic the gait modality. Thus, we are not proposing a solution that will support
liveness detection at the sensor level, however, we can support security at the signal level due
to the multimodal nature of the proposed framework.
Initially, at the enrolment stage, the biometric signatures of an individual for gait and
activityrelatedmodalities are obtained. The extracted features form the vector Fi = [ f1, . . . , fk],
whereby i ∈ gait, activity related and fi ∈ Rk . The feature vector Fi is then uniformly
transformed from the continuous to the discrete domain of 2L levels through the function
u : Rk → Qk whereby Q = 0, 1. . . , l − 1. Each one of the resulting vectors q = u(Fi) is fed
to the Slepian.Wolf encoder, which performs the mapping e : Qk → Cn where C = {0, 1}
outputs the codeword c = e(q), c ∈ Cn.
As already mentioned, herein the Slepian-Wolf algorithm has been implemented by a
systematic LDPC encoder (Gallager (1963)) (see Figure 8). LDPC codes were selected due
to their excellent error detecting and correcting capabilities. They also provide near-capacity
performance over a large range of channels while simultaneously admitting implementable
decoders. An LDPC code (n, k) is a linear block code of codeword length n and information
block length k which is defined by a sparse (n− k)× n parity matrix H, where n− k denotes
the parity bits produced by the encoder. The code rate is defined as r = k/n. A code is a
systematic code if every codeword consists of the original k− bit information vector followed
by (n− k) parity-bits. In the proposed system, the joint bit-plane encoding scheme of (Girod
et al. (2005)) was employed to avoid encoding and storing the L bit-planes of the vector q
separately.
Fig. 8. Encoding via a Parity Check Matrix.
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Subsequently, the k systematic bits of the codeword ci are discarded and only the syndrome
s, that is the n− k parity bits of the codeword c, is stored to the biometric database. Thus, the
biometric templates of an enrolled user consist of the syndromes s = [ck+1. . . cn], s ∈ C(n− k),
and their size is n− k. It must be stressed that the rate of the two LDPC encoders is different
because the statistical properties of the two modalities are different.
Similarly to the enrollment procedure the biometric feature vector F′i is obtained quantized
at the authentication stage. This, together with encoded syndrome sencodedi are fed to the
LDPC decoder. The decoding function d : C(n − k) × Rk → Qk combines Fi with the
corresponding syndromes which are retrieved from the biometric database and correspond
to the claimed identity I. The decoder employs belief-propagation (Ryan (n.d.)) to decode the
received codewords.
If the errors introduced in the side information with respect to the originally encoded signal
are within the error correcting capabilities of the channel decoder then the correct codeword
is output after an experimentally set (Nc=30) number of iterations and the transaction is
considered as a client transaction. To detect whether a codeword is correctly decoded we
add 16 Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) bits at the beginning of the feature vector Fi. By
examining these bits the integrity of the original data is detected. If the codeword is correctly
decoded, then the transaction is considered as genuine. Otherwise, if the decoder can not
decode the codeword (Niter ≥ Nc) a special symbol ∅ is output and the transaction is
considered as an impostor transaction.
From the above, it is obvious that the level of security and the performance of the system
significantly bases on the number of the parity bits in syndrome si, apart from the error
correcting performance of the channel code.
On the one hand, a channel code with low code rate exhibits high error correcting capabilities,
which results in the decoding of very noisy signals. This means, that the channel decoder will
be able to decode the codeword even if the noise in the biometric signal has been induced by
impostors. Additionally, will consist of many bits and will be more difficult to forge. On the
other hand, channel codes of high code rate exhibit limited error-correcting capabilities and
reduce the security of the system since the parity bits produced by the channel encoder consist
of a few bits. Thus, the design of an effective biometric system based on the channel codes
involves the careful selection of the channel code rate to achieve the optimal trade-off between
performance and security. In this respect, a method for further securing the syndrome si
is proposed in the following section (4.2). Thus, both the security of a long syndrome is
preserved, while improved performance is provided.
4.2 Encryption scheme
The second phase of the security template algorithm, that is implemented via an encryption
algorithm (“Keygenerator′′ box in Figure 7) has a dual mission. On the one hand, it further
ensures the security of the stored biometric syndromes Sgait and Sactivity (see Section 4.1) and
on the other hand, it provides a novel method for fusing static physiological information with
dynamic behavioural traits. An interesting novelty introduced by the specific methodology
is that the user is no longer obliged to memorize a pin, in order to secure his data. On the
contrary, the personal password is automatically extracted from a series of Nb soft biometric
features. Thus, the password can neither be stolen nor copied. The utilized methodology is
presented below.
In the current implementation of the proposed framework Nb = 2 soft biometric
characteristics have been included. However, the framework can be easily extended to
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any arbitrary number of soft biometric features, depending on the utilized modalities. In
particular, the Height and the StrideLength (see Figure 9) of the user have been utilized hereby
according to the following extendable methodology.
Fig. 9. Stride length (left) and Height (Right) of a user drawn on his/her Gait Energy Image
(GEI).
It has been experimentally noticed that the measurement regarding the user’s Stride are much
more noisy than the ones for his/her Height. Thus, the ratio of HeightStride has been preferred
over pure Stride scores, in order to provide a more uniform score distribution for the second
soft-biometric trait.
First, a two dimensional hash table is formed, whereby its dimension is limited by the
minimum and maximum expected value of each soft biometric trait, as illustrated in Figure
10/left. The resolution f heights and f strides of the grid in each dimension respectively is scalable,
in order to be optimally adjusted to the needs of each implementation of the framework (see
Section 6). Thereafter, a unique biometric key is estimated for each cell on the grid (or cube or
hypercube in the case of Nb ≥ 2), according to the corresponding Soft Biometric values. Thus,
we can write for the general case of Nb available soft biometric traits
Key(n1, n2, . . . , nNb ) =
∑
Nb
i=1 ni
Nb
(12)
whereby ni stands for the index of the hash table (see Figure 10/left) and is calculated as
ni = int(
vi
f is
). vi stands for the extracted value of the ith Soft Biometric trait.
In this context, it is expected that the same user will always obtain the same biometric key,
since his soft biometric properties will always assign his identity with the same hypercube in
the grid.
In the following, the syndromes Si of the ith modality are encrypted using the Rijndael
implementation (Daemen & Rijmen (1999)) of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Specifically, the 128 − bit extracted key is used to shuffle the syndrome bits. Simple
zero-padding technique is performed on the syndrome bits vector, in the cases where their
number is not a whole multiplier of 27 bits. Similarly, a 256 − bit key could have been
extracted, however it has been experimentally seen that it offers a bad trade-off between
computational resources and security improvement.
In this respect, the biometric key is used to shuffle/deshuffle the syndromes for the claimed
ID in the enrollment/authentication phase of the biometric system, respectively. It is easy
to understand that most probably an impostor would be assigned to a different cell on the
grid, given his different soft biometric characteristics with respect to the claimed ID. Thus, the
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Fig. 10. 2D Soft Biometric Grid (Left) - 3D Soft Biometric Grid (Right)
requested syndrome bits will be wrongly decrypted and the applied dynamic biometric trait
will never match the decoded one (see Section 4.1).
5. Score fusion
In order to provide an overall distance score between the user requesting access and the
corresponding claimed ID, a fusion of the partial matching distances for each modality has
to be performed. The fusion approach that has been utilized for the current biometric system
is based on score level fusion. Thus, the optimal fusion score, that would combine unequally
amounts of information from each RP is defined as follows
Stot = W · S =
N
∑
j=1
wjsj = w1s1 + w2s2 + . . . + wNsN (13)
whereby W is the weight coefficient matrix with N wj elements and Sj the score matrix having
as elements the corresponding partial matching distances sj.
In this respect, the most common problem that has to be solved in a score-level fusion
approach is the optimal estimation of matrix W. Given the general structure of a multimodal
biometric system, it is expected that the authentication capacity would be higher for
some modalities than for some others. Thus, a rational way for defining the partial
weight coefficients wj for each modality is to assign a value proportional to their overall
authentication performance, as follows:
wj = 1−
EERj
∑
N
j=1 EERj
(14)
where EERj stands for the Equal Error Rate score for the jth modality.
For the current bi-modal (N = 2) biometric system, the values for each wj are defined as:
w1 = 1−
EER1
EER1 + EER2
; w2 = 1−
EER2
EER1 + EER2
(15)
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In order to provide normalized scores in the range of values for each modality, all scores have
been normalized to a common basis according to the following equation:
snorm = (
0.5
TL
)e(−
s
smax ) (16)
where snormk is the normalized score value, sk the non-normalized score, s
max
k the maximum
possible score value and Tk an experimentally set threshold for the kth modality; k ∈
{RIT,CIT,DTW}.
6. Results
The current Section starts with a short description of the database on which the experiments
have been carried out. In the following, the identification and authentication results of the
presented framework implementation are exhibited and qualitatively evaluated. A short
discussion about the proposed framework is also included.
6.1 Database
The evaluation of the proposed secure multimodal biometric framework has been performed
on the proprietary ACTIBIO-dataset (ACTIBIO ICT STREP (2008)). The current annotated
database was captured in an ambient intelligence indoor environment and consists of 29
subjects, performing a series of everyday workplace & office activities. The workplace
recordings include 29 subjects walking in various paths of 6m, while being recorded by a
stereoscopic camera that was placed 2.5m away from the walking path and lateral to the
walking direction. In order to test the permanence of the biometric features, the recordings
have been repeated in a second session, few months after the first one.
Regarding the office recordings, the same 29 subjects have been recorded in an ambient
intelligence (AmI) indoor environment, while they have been performing a series of everyday
office activities with no special protocol, such as a phone conversation, typing, talking to a
microphone panel and drinking water. Each subject repeated the same sequence of activities
8 times in total, split in two sessions while a manual annotation of the database has followed.
Among the five cameras that have been recording the users from different view-angles, only
the recordings from a frontal stereoscopic camera have been used for the current work.
Within the current work, the traits of the aforementioned modalities have been combined,
in order to create 29 user-specific multimodal signatures. In this respect, each subject has
been registered to the system (gallery signatures) by using his gait biometric signature together
with his behavioural response during a phone conversation. Despite the fact that the current
dataset does also include complicated gait scenarios, whereby the subject is carrying a bag
or a coat, the simplest version has been utilized within the presented work. Similarly, only
the “Phone Conversation” activity has been used from the office environment. Similarly, the
recordings from each modality for a different repetition have been combined in order to form
the probe signatures for the system.
6.2 Authentication & verification results
As it has already been stressed out the major contribution of the current framework is that
it allows higher level of security of the biometric templates stored in the database, while
higher recognition performance is simultaneously provide via the encoding of soft biometrics.
The improved level of security can be easily noticed, when considering that the information
stored in the database is encrypted. In this respect, not data can be retrieved from the
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database without providing the correct key. Further, even if this encryption step is somehow
bypassed, the obtained data remain still of no use to the attacker, since they reveal no biometric
information as explained in Section 4.1.
Moreover, in order to illustrate the advances performed in the recognition performance
via indirect fusion/encoding of the soft biometric traits with the dynamic ones, the initial
recognition capabilities of the utilized traits is shown in Figure 11. In the same Figures
the reader can notice a slight degradation in the recognition performance of the activity
related modality, when the templates that are stored in the database are secured via the
LDPC encoding algorithm (Section 4.1). Contrary to the 1D feature vector of the gait
modality, activity related feature vectors are much more complex. Thus, a degradation
in the authentication performance is more likely due to the noisy errors at the decoding.
Moreover, a degradation is expected, since this is the trade off for adding enhanced security
in the biometric system. Specifically, such a deterioration have been mainly caused by the
unintended reconstruction of an impostor’s feature vector, so that it resembles a genuine user.
Fig. 11. EER Scores (left) and Identification performance (right) of the proposed modalities
prior to encryption.
As it has been mentioned in Section 4.2 the current framework allows a scalable resolution
of the hash table that is used for encryption, so that optimal performance of the system is
achieved, given different soft biometrics. In this respect, the Optimal Functional Point (OFP) of
the current system has been set according to the results illustrated in Figures 12. Specifically,
one can notice that an intense degradation of the system’s recognition performance for high
resolution values (≡ large number of available keys in Hash Matrix of Figure 10left). This
is caused by the noisy measurements of the soft biometric trait in different repetitions. For
instance, let us assume a user that has been registered to the system with a vHeight = 1.79 and
vStride = 1.62. He/she would be assigned the key K(17, 14). A noisy measurement of his soft
biometrics at the authentication stage might result that his stored syndrome s was attempted
to be decoded by a different key Key(nprobe1 , n
probe
2 ) = K(17, 14). Thus, the decrypting would
never be successful and the recognition would fail. The reason for which the EER scores
of the activity related modality exhibits more fluctuations than the one of the gait bases on
the following fact: The soft biometric measurements of some impostors in the authentication
stage did not only lie within the same hash bin as the client, but also their activity related traits
managed to be decoded via LDPC using the syndrome of the claimed user’s ID.
In this concept, it can be concluded that high resolution values, which refer to a big number
of bins in the hash table, are intolerant to noisy measurements. On the other hand, small
resolution values may result to the fact that all subjects are assigned to the same key K and
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Fig. 12. EER scores of the proposed modalities as a function of the HeightStride step.
thus, the encryption scheme would have no meaning. On the contrary, there is always an
functional point, whereby the recognition performance of the system is optimal.
Moreover, the reader can notice in Figure 12 that for the HeightStride step = 0.25 both modalities
achieve their authentication performance. Thus, this value can be considered the system’s
optimal functional point for a given Height resolution in the hash table, experimentally set at
f Heights .
Fig. 13. Client/Impostor Distributions for the gait modality at the optimal functional
point(left) and without Encryption(right) via the Biometric key.
Although there seems to be only small changes in the EER scores for small resolution values,
the distribution of the genuine/impostor scores significantly changes (see Figure 13).
Fig. 14. EER Scores (left) and Identification performance (right) of the proposed system.
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Given the optimal functional point of the encryption system, optimal fusion of the soft
biometrics with the dynamic traits has been also achieved. In this respect, the current test case
of the proposed framework has been evaluated in terms of its overall recognition performance,
by performing fusion between the two utilized behavioral biometrics (Sections 3.1 & 3.2) as
described in Section 5. The derived optimal recognition performance of the bimodal biometric
system system is illustrated in Figures 14, in terms of both authentication and identification
capacity.
Concluding, it must be noted that the potential of the proposed framework in terms of
recognition performance is significantly high. Given a larger number of soft biometrics,
an almost 1 − 1 proportion for keys-users can be achieved, which would lead to further
decreasing of the recognition error.
7. Conclusions
Summarizing, the advantages of the proposed method in terms of security and impact on
matching accuracy for recognition purposes have been thoroughly analyzed and discussed.
The performance of the proposed method is assessed in the context of ACTIBIO, an EU
Specific Targeted Research Project, where activity-related and gait biometrics are employed
in an unobtrusive application scenario for human recognition. The experimental evaluation
on a multimodal biometric database demonstrates the validity of the proposed framework.
Most important, the dual scope of the current framework has been illustrated. Specifically,
the utilization of the encryption algorithm does not only provide enhanced template security;
it does also provide indirect fusion with soft biometric characteristics and thus it improves
the recognition potential. Finally, the proposed user-specific biometric key, which exclusively
depends on the user’s biometry, increases the level of unobtrusiveness of the system, since the
user is not obliged anymore to memorize pins or to carry ID cards.
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